ARE ALL ‘LEGAL DOLLARS’ CREATED EQUAL?
BY

YUVAL FELDMAN & DORON TEICHMAN*
“Whether you like it or whether
you do not money is money and
1
that is all there is about it”
INTRODUCTION

Dollars are fungible. That is one of the basic assumptions of classic economic
theory. The practical meaning of this assumption is that a win of $300 in a football
bet, a $3 increase in the price of a stock for which one owns 100 shares, or a $300 rise
in the value of a pension will all affect the consumption behavior of the individual in
an identical fashion.3 Building on this assumption, law and economics scholars have
also treated legal payments as fungible. To put things in the terminology often used
by legal economists, legal payments are a price set for an activity. Just as a dollar paid
for a tomato is identical to a dollar paid for a cucumber, so are a dollar paid as a
pollution tax to the government and a dollar paid as compensation to the party injured
by the pollution. The two simply represent the price a polluter must pay in order to
engage in the polluting activity.
2

Recently, Gneezy and Rustichini used an experimental setting in order to
explore whether fines actually function as prices.4 In their study they imposed a
monetary fine on parents who were late picking up their child from a day-care center.
After the introduction of the fine, they observed a steady increase in the number of
parents coming in late.5 This result runs contrary to traditional deterrence models that
predict that increasing the cost of an activity will necessarily decrease the rate at
which it is performed. Gneezy and Rustichini offer two explanations for their
surprising results. First, the introduction of the fine may have changed parents’
perception of the social dynamic between themselves and the day-care center. That is
to say, parents may have viewed the fine as a price for arriving late. According to this
logic, as long as they paid the price for such behavior, parents felt comfortable being
*
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late.6 Second, the fine may have revealed information to parents regarding the
expected sanction for tardiness. Thus, parents who were previously punctual out of
fear of incurring a costly sanction may have exercised less caution after learning the
actual cost of the behavior, as revealed by the fine.7
While Gneezy and Rustichini offer some interesting insights regarding the
relationship between fines and prices, one should note that the fine imposed on
parents in their study included two unique characteristics that do not necessarily
represent all legal payments. First, the imposition of the fine was certain. All of the
parents knew that they would be fined every time they came in late. In most realworld situations, however, fines are imposed probabilistically. A driver speeding on
the freeway can end up paying a fine, but can also end up paying nothing. Second, the
payment of the fine was made directly to the entity that was harmed by the
wrongdoer. Fines, on the other hand, are in many cases paid to third parties that were
not directly harmed by the regulated act. Paying an emissions tax provides the
government with income, but does not assure any compensation for the people
harmed by the pollution.
Our goal in this study is to explore how different characteristics of legal
payments affect the way in which people perceive them, and as a result the way they
might behave. The three characteristics we focus on are: (a) the timing of the payment
– we distinguish between payments that are made prior to committing the harmful act
and those made after the act has already been committed; (b) the identity of the party
to which the payment is made – we distinguish between payments that function as
compensation and are therefore paid to the injured party and those that are paid to a
third party; and (c) whether or not the payment was probabilistic – we distinguish
between payments that are certain and those that are not.
We conjecture that social norms, cognitive biases, and other forces could
cause people to behave differently under legal rules that create similar economic
consequences. More specifically, we expect that when the legal payment is done in
advance, with certainty and to the party who was harmed by the behavior, the
similarity to a price will be greater, leading people to show greater willingness to
engage in the harm creating behavior if they find it beneficial. As the legal structure
shifts away from the paradigmatic structure of a price, by moving the payment after
the fact, adding a probabilistic element to it, and changing the identity of the recipient,
people might be less inclined to treat the legal payment as a price, leading them to be
less willing to engage in harm creating behavior even if it is in their best interest to do
so.
Using a sample of 420 students, we employed a between-subject, three-factor
design. Each factor was divided along two levels: timing of payment (ex-ante v. ex
post), identity of recipient (state vs. injured party), and level of certainty (certain vs.
probable). Participants were randomly divided amongst the six experimental
conditions. In each experimental condition, a questionnaire was introduced with a
hypothetical scenario that involved the behavior of an owner of a factory that creates a
negative externality in its production process. Following the scenario, participants
were asked about their likely behavior, as well as their social, legal and moral
6
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perceptions. Overall, we found that participants were more likely to engage in
production when they paid the individual, when they paid in advance and when the
payment was not probabilistic.
The article is organized as follows: Part I reviews the relevant background to
our study. We outline traditional economic and legal scholarship that treats money in
general and legal payments specifically as fungible. We then explore studies that
suggest that neither is fungible, and that similar payments could generate different
behaviors. Building on these studies, we will suggest several hypotheses as to the
differences between legal regimes. Part II describes the design of the experiment and
its results. In part III we discuses our results, explore the potential policy implications,
and deal with some of the limitations. Finally, in part IV we briefly conclude.
I.

BACKGROUND

The law sets a menu of reactions to different types of behaviors. Take for
example the case of a homeowner who throws a party that creates a nuisance to his
neighbors, and assume that the law wants to promote efficiency by causing the
homeowner to internalize the harm caused to his neighbors. One can imagine several
legal regimes that will achieve this goal. The law could require permits for parties,
and grant them after a fee equaling the size of the externality is paid. Alternatively,
the law could prohibit parties, and fine homeowners who hold them with a fine
equaling the size of the externality. Finally, the law could allow the homeowner’s
neighbors to sue and collect damages that reflect their harms. In this study, we attempt
to measure whether the choice between different legal regimes affects the way people
perceive the situation, and as a result the way they behave.
Looking at the body of legal payments, we identify three dimensions that
differentiate them. The first is the timing of the payment. While some payments are
made prior to the act being regulated (e.g., a fee), others are made after the fact (e.g., a
fine). The second is the identity of the party receiving the payment. Some legal
payments are made to the injured party while others are made to third parties (e.g., the
state). The following table summarizes the way in which legal payments align along
the first two dimensions we explore:
TABLE 1: LEGAL PAYMENTS - TIMING OF PAYMENT AND IDENTITY OF RECIPIENT

Third Party

Injured Party

Ex-Ante

Fee

Contract Payment

Ex-Post

Fine

Tort Damages

A third dimension by which legal payments differ relates to the certainty of
their imposition. Ex ante payments are by definition certain, and are therefore not
analyzed along this dimension. Ex post payments, on the other hand, are either certain
or probabilistic. Returning to the example of the party, while private enforcement
might be certain in that setting (note that if the neighbors did not detect the party that
3

would imply that no harm was caused), public enforcement will sometimes fail,
leading to no payment. Economic analysis has explored how discrete changes in the
probability of detection can be dealt with through proper adjustments of sanctions.8
We do not aim to explore the effects of such discrete changes. Rather, our focus is on
the effect of switching from a regime in which the probability of detection is 100% to
one in which it is lower (be the precise probability as it may).
For economists, the comparison between different legal regimes that set
monetary consequences to an act is straightforward. Since all dollars are fungible, and
rational individuals aim to maximize the amount of dollars they have, economists
generally assume that the legal framing of a payment is irrelevant to the decisions
individuals make. For example, the chapter in a leading microeconomics text book
dealing with negative externalities describes taxes, subsidies, and private rights, as
equivalent from the perspective of the individuals engaging in the regulated activity.9
From an economic point of view, these are merely names for the price that needs to be
paid for the activity. Building on this assumption, the “seminal insight” of law and
economics was that the legal system sets prices for different acts, and that the tools of
price theory can be employed in order to predict the way different legal rules will
influence peoples’ decisions.10 Based on this insight, legal economists modeled the
incentives created by an array of legal payments. Contract remedies were modeled as
prices set by the law for breaching a contract.11 Tort compensation was analyzed as a
price set for engaging in risky behavior.12 Similarly, criminal sanctions were modeled
as prices affecting criminals’ decision whether to commit a crime.13 Later
contributions continued this line of thought and modeled the different substitution
effects between legal prices.14
The positive view of legal payments as prices went hand in hand with the
normative claim that when efficiency calls for it, breaching a legal duty while paying
the legal price is the desirable mode of action. If legal prices are set in an efficient
manner that reflects all of the harms associated with a certain breach of duty, then
breaching and paying the price implies a gain in social welfare. In the contractual
setting this claim manifested itself in the efficient breach debate.15 Easterbrook and
8
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Fischel portray the view of legal payments as prices more generally in the following
statement:
The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure
of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to
the rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is based on the
supposition that managers not only may but also should
violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.16
A corollary of the seminal insight is that different legal regimes are merely
tools in a policymaker’s toolbox, and that the choice between them should be guided
by the costs and benefits of administering them, and not by an inherent difference
between them. Coase bases his endorsement of property rights over taxation as a way
to deal with negative externalities on the assumption that setting the appropriate level
of taxation might be a difficult task for the government.17 A more detailed analysis of
the question was later offered by Shavell, who explored the advantages and
disadvantages of different legal regimes aimed at controlling risk.18 Shavell divided
the different regimes along two of the three dimensions we explore in this study,
namely: ex post versus ex ante regimes and regimes that are initiated by private
parties compared to those that are controlled by the state.19 Discussing the relative
advantages of ex post and ex ante regimes, Shavell deals with questions such as do
injurers have sufficient resources to pay for the harm they cause? Can specific injurers
be identified and assigned liability? Which party possesses information regarding the
risk and the ability to reduce it? What are the administrative costs associated with
each regime?20 Similarly, Shavell’s analysis of the private-state dimension focuses on
issues like the level of dispersion of harm and the parties’ information.21 Neither
Coase nor Shavell explore the possibility that the legal framing itself will affect the
parties’ incentives, and thus could affect the selection of the optimal legal regime.
Despite these views, some law and economics scholars have explored the
boundary of perceiving legal remedies as prices. Cooter, for instance, distinguished
between prices and sanctions based on the nature of the legal rule.22 According to
Cooter’s definition, a sanction “is a detriment imposed for doing what is forbidden,”
while a price is “payment of money which is required in order to do what is
permitted.”23 In other words, sanctions are attached to behaviors that violate a certain
standard set by the law, while prices are attached to certain behaviors no matter how
they are preformed. Thus, for example, Cooter suggests that liability within a
negligence rule is a sanction, while liability created by a strict liability rule is a
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price.24 Nonetheless, one should notice that Cooter’s distinction between prices and
sanctions does not challenge the basic assumption that all legal payments are fungible.
According to Cooter, a sanction of $100 and a price of $100 create identical
incentives. Rather, it is the discontinuation in legal liability in a sanctioning system
(created by the shift from no liability to total liability when one violates the legal
standard) that distinguishes the incentives created by the two systems.
The assumption of fungible legal dollars runs against several bodies of
literature. Social scientists have documented many instances in which people do not
treat their dollars as fungible. Legal scholars have argued both that different legal
payments ought to be viewed as different, and that people in fact view them as
different. We turn now to review this literature, and to present its implications to our
study.
Sociologists have long since differentiated between different types of monies.
In her study, The Social Meaning of Money, Zelizer documents a wide range of
situations in which people earmark monies in unique ways.25 In early 20th century
America, money earned by women was dedicated to specific purposes.26 Similarly, a
set of social norms limited the way money received as a gift could be used.27 For
instance, gift money was not to be used for expenses such as grocery shopping or for
paying a gambling debt.28 Zelizer concludes that people think and feel differently
about various types of money, which brings about different uses of these monies.29
While this literature provides a theoretical foundation for our study, in the sense that it
demonstrates that people do not treat all of their dollars as fungible, it does not
provide us with specific hypotheses. Zelizer generally deals with the way people treat
money they have, not the way they treat money they must pay. Furthermore, Zelizer
does not explore the unique characteristics of legal payments as such.
Some economists have also shifted from the fungibility assumption,
documenting its violations30: Graduate students with high expected incomes do not
treat present and future dollars as fungible and tend to consume less than the life cycle
theory of consumption would suggest.31 Dollars that are earmarked by employers as
“regular” income or as a “bonus” are consumed differently by households.32 People
receiving relatively small windfalls tend to consume them in a way that violates
rational choice theory.33 Much like the sociological literature, we find this line of
literature motivating, yet we cannot generate specific hypotheses based on it.
Economic studies of the fungibility of money have also focused on money people
receive and the way they spend it (in economic terms, economists have measured the
24
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marginal propensity to consume). They have not measured non-fungibility between
different payments, let alone between different types of legal payments.
Non-fungibility of money was documented in the crowding out literature as
well. Generally, this literature suggests that external interventions that utilize
monetary incentives or punishments may undermine (and under different identifiable
conditions strengthen) intrinsic motivations.34 For instance, paying people in return
for their blood might erode altruistic blood donations.35 A refinement of the crowding
out literature demonstrated that the framing of incentives affects peoples’ behavior.
Fehr and Gachter found that when monetary incentives were framed as a price
reduction, they had a greater effect than when they were framed as a bonus.36 Frey
and Stutzer have argued that tradable emission rights and emission taxes could create
a different crowding out effect, bringing about different behavior.37 This refinement
of the crowding-out literature leads us to assume that the legal framing of payments
could affect the way in which the law crowds out alternative reasons for action,
thereby affecting people's behavior.
An additional line of economic studies that offers more concrete predictions
for our study is that dealing with decision making in situations of uncertainty. This
literature demonstrated that people tend to prefer certain outcomes over probabilistic
ones.38 For example, given the choice between 3,000 for sure and 4,000 with 80%
probability, people will tend to choose the certain 3,000. However, when choosing
between 3,000 with 25% probability and 4,000 with 20% probability, most people
choose the 4,000 option, despite the fact that the second set of options is the same as
the first with all probabilities reduced by a factor of 4.39 The reduction of the
probability of winning from 1.0 to 0.25 had a much larger effect than the reduction
from 0.8 to 0.2.40 These results imply that shifting from a probabilistic to a certain
sanction (while holding the size of the sanction constant) might increase the level of
the activity being sanctioned because people will no longer have to deal with the
uncertainty associated with the sanction.41 Note that this prediction runs against
34
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traditional deterrence models, according to which any increase in the probability of
detection will necessarily reduce activity levels. The reason for this discrepancy is
that traditional theories treated the switch between a probabilistic and a certain regime
as merely another “regular” increase in the probability of detection.
Turning to the legal literature, we find several claims made regarding different
types of legal payments. The legal philosophy literature has explored in depth the
inherent distinction between different types of legal payments. To be sure, the
normative nature of the philosophical claims reviewed below renders them distinct
from social scientific hypotheses, which are designed to undergo empirical
assessment. Thus, one might question the relevance of this literature to an empirical
project such as ours. Nonetheless, there are two reasons we find this literature
relevant. First, despite the normative-positive dichotomy, legal philosophers build
some of their insights on “armchair” sociology and assumptions regarding human
intuition. Second, even if the philosophical project is purely normative, one would
expect to observe some type of correlation between what constitutes normatively
desirable behavior and actual behavior.
Up untill the 1960s, Anglo-American legal philosophy focused on the role of
sanctions in creating legal obligations. For instance, John Austin viewed law as a set
of commands created by a sovereign and backed by sanctions.42 This line of thought
supports the law as a price setting device view endorsed by legal economists. Yet,
later legal philosophers have presented a competing view as to the role of law within
the process of reasoning. In The Concept of Law, H. L. A. Hart presented what is
seen as a successful critic of Austin’s command theory of law.43 As Hart pointed out,
legal rules are not simply a set of rules backed by sanctions.44 Rather, the body of law
includes an array of enabling regimes that are not built on sanctions.45 In addition,
Hart emphasized the role of obligations created by law. This analysis led Hart to
distinguish between taxation and fines as means to achieve social control. As he put it,
“[a] punishment for a crime, such as a fine, is not the same as a tax on a course of
conduct, though both involve directions to officials to inflict the same money loss.
What differentiates these ideas is that the first involves, as the second does not, an
offence or breach of duty in the form of a violation of a rule set up to guide the
conduct of ordinary citizens.”46 Hart’s analysis captures the intuition that different
types of legal payments are inherently different since they embody a different moral
meaning.
Raz offers a different account of the role of norms.47 Raz distinguishes
between first-order and second-order reasons for actions. First-order reasons refer to a
simple weighing of the different considerations to act in a certain manner.48 Second
order reasons, on the other hand, guide the decision maker how to combine first order
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reasons.49 According to Raz, legal rules requiring performance (or omission) of an act
function as exclusionary second order norms, which exclude from deliberation
reasons that are not legal norms or legally recognized norms.50 Notice that this
analysis suggests that behavior should not be affected by the size of the expected
sanction, since the price of the act is an excluded reason.51 Raz also points out that
some legal rules function as permissive rules.52 These laws actually function as a
permission to perform the act, and exclude from deliberation reasons not to act that
are not legal norms or legally recognized reasons. Note that within this legal
framework, one would expect to observe sensitivity to the expected sanction set by
the law, since prices are not an excluded reason in this context.
A second strand of legal scholarship our study relates to is that dealing with
the expressive power of law. Expressive theories consist of an array of distinct claims,
including theories of lawmaking, claims about the connection between the law and
social norms, and positive predictions as to the way different legal expressions affect
behavior.53 Our focus here is on the expressive theories of sanctions. Expressive
theories of sanctions argue that, as a descriptive matter, one should distinguish
between penalties and punishments.54 While penalties function to a large degree as
prices, punishments include a deeper social meaning that express resentment and
indignation.55 Thus, when legal payments are framed as punishments, the power of
the law to regulate behavior is greater. An example of the way expressive theories of
sanctions have played out in policy debates can be found in the different views
presented regarding the use of emission trading. Economists generally view emission
trading as an efficient way to allocate polluting rights.56 Legal environmentalists, on
the other hand, have raised the concern that emission trading will function as a price,
and lead to a greater degradation of the environment.57
The expressive literature has yet to offer a systematic analysis of legal
payments that can explain what precisely distinguishes between penalties and
punishments. One recurring theme in this literature is that criminal sanctions carry a
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powerful expressive force when compared to other forms of sanctioning.58 In our
framework, this would imply that a combination of an ex-post probabilistic payment
with the state as the recipient of the payment carries a social meaning that gives it
greater deterrent power. Yet, it is not clear if it is the combination of all of these that
creates the unique social meaning, or if each characteristic creates the meaning on its
own. We conjecture that it is the first two that carry the expressive social meaning.
Probabilistic payments might imply an element of wrongdoing on the part of the
paying party. One does not “get caught” or “get away” if one engages in socially
legitimate activities. It is only wrongdoers engaging in blameworthy behavior who
"get caught." Ex post payments might have a similar meaning since they are payments
that are forced upon the actor by the state. Ex ante payments, on the other hand, are
made with consent, which could imply no wrongdoing on behalf of the paying party.
Regarding the identity of the party receiving the payment, it is difficult to see a
necessary conclusion to be drawn. The state clearly has strong expressive powers, but
those could be used both to prohibit and to legitimize an act. Thus, we cannot assume
that paying the state will always carry an identical expressive meaning. However,
given that both the difference in time and difference in probability are two qualities
that differentiate fines from prices, we might expect that this effect will be greater for
the state. It seems that when the recipient of the money is the state, and when the
payment is dependent upon getting caught, the payment will look like a fine rather
than a price. Similarly, paying the state in advance may foster a presumption of
legality, as if the state has licensed the behavior in question. Thus, we expect to see
some interaction between these three factors, where time and certainty will exert a
greater effect when the recipient of the payment is the state, rather than the individual.
A final body of scholarship we draw from is the incommensurability
literature.59 Sunstein defines incommensurability as a situation in which “the relevant
goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without violence to our considered
judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”60 Unlike the utilitarian
claim that decisions can be aligned along a utility metric, and the economic
assumption that decisions can be evaluated through a monetary metric, the
incommensurability view holds that some types of decisions do not reflect a
preference of one value over the other. In the context of compensatory damages,
incommensurability suggests that they do not function as a price.61 Rather, they are
intended to acknowledge wrongdoing on the part of the wrongdoer, and to bring
redress to victims by showing that their rights are taken seriously.62 Thus, this
literature suggests that in a compensatory setting the payment of damages
encompasses a moral content not present in other settings. This content might
discourage people from conducting a simple cost benefit analysis because they do not

58

Feinberg, supra note 54; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 397-400 (1997).
59
For important contributions to the philosophical literature on incommensurability see ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322
(1986). Later legal implications of the concept were discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES (1996).
60
Sunstein, id. at 796.
61
See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); Sunstein,
id. at 840-43.
62
Radin, id. at 61.
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see the dollars they pay as damages on the same metric as the harm caused to the
injured party.
In sum, we have identified three structural dimensions that differentiate legal
payments: timing, recipient identity, and certainty. Reviewing the literature has led us
to conclude that, even when legal payments are structured such that their economic
consequences are similar, they might be perceived by people as different. These
differences, in turn, may yield different behavior patterns. With this background in
hand, we turn to explore these differences.
II.

THE EXPERIMENT

1. Participants and Design
A total of 420 students at Bar-Ilan University and the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem completed the questionnaire. The participants were not familiar with the
legal issues that were described in the questionnaire. We employed a between-subject,
three-factor design. Each factor was divided along two levels: timing of payment (exante vs. ex post), identity of recipient (state vs. injured party), and level of certainty
(certain vs. probable).
2. Procedure
Participants were randomly divided amongst the six experimental conditions.
The questionnaire was introduced with a hypothetical scenario that involved the
behavior of an owner of a factory that creates a negative externality in its production
process. The text of the questionnaire, distributed to all subjects, read as follows (In
Hebrew; for a translation of the full questionnaire see appendix):
"Assume that you own a fertilizer factory located adjacent to a small lake. You
recently received an order for fertilizer, which the factory has not produced
previously. It will cost the factory 200,000 Shekels [around $50,000] to produce the
order. Producing this particular fertilizer also involves dumping a new kind of
chemical into the lake. The only effect of dumping this chemical into the lake will be
to raise the production expenses of a neighboring fertilizer factory, which is also
located at the edge of the same lake. With the exception of the neighboring factory,
the lake water is not used by anyone else. Additionally, the new chemical does not
cause any medical problems or damage to the environment."
The first sub-group was told that, according to the law, in order to dump the chemical
they need to pay a license fee of 100,000 Shekels (around $25,000), ex-ante
(henceforth: Ex-ante-state).
The second sub-group was told that, according to the law, in order to dump the
chemical they need to pay the neighboring factory a sum of 100,000 Shekels
(henceforth: Ex-ante-Individual).
The third sub-group was told that, according to the law, if they dump the chemical
they are sure to be sued by the neighboring factory, and are expected to pay a sum of
100,000 Shekels (henceforth: Ex-post-Individual-certain).
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The fourth sub-group was told that, according to the law, if they dump the chemical
they might be sued by the neighboring factory, and that if they are sued they are
expected to pay a sum of 100,000 Shekels (henceforth: Ex-post-Individualprobable).
The fifth sub-group was told that, according to the law, if they dump the chemical
they will be fined 100,000 Shekels by the municipal authority. Participants in that
group were told that due to some state of the art equipment detection of dumping is
certain (Henceforth: Ex-post-State-certain).
The sixth sub-group was told that, according to the law, if they dump the chemical
there is a good chance that they would be sued by the authorities and would have to
pay a fine of 100,000 Shekels by the municipal authority (Henceforth: Ex-post-Stateprobable).
The seventh sub-group served as a control and did not undergo any manipulation.
Following the short presentation of the vignettes, participants were asked to
estimate the sum of money they would ask for in order to produce the chemical.63 In
addition, we asked participants about the perceived ethicality of producing the
chemical, whether they thought that producing the chemical was the right move for
them, whether it was legally permissible to do so, and finally, about the likelihood
that in this given situation they would engage in producing the chemical. (For the full
questionnaire see appendix).
3.

Results

A. Differences Between 'Legal Dollars'
In order to compare the groups, they were divided according to two criteria: a)
the entity receiving the sum of 100,000 NIS, where one category relates to the State
(Groups 1, 5, and 6) and the second to the individual (Groups 2, 3, and 4); b) the
certainty of payment and time of payment, where one category relates to certain
payment ahead of time (groups 1 and 2, heretofore Ex ante), a second to certain
payment after the fact (Groups 3 and 5, heretofore, Ex-post), and a third to uncertain
payment after the fact (Groups 4 and 6, heretofore, Ex-post probable).64 After this, a
series of 2-Way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA, 2 X 3) were performed (payment
receiving entity x certainty of payment and time).65 The dependent variables, each

63

Given that the money people asked for could be dictated by a large number of factors, and that the
definition of what is a large sum of money might vary from one person to another, we supplemented
this question with an explicit question of whether they think they should ask for a large sum of money
in order to produce the fertilizer. For further discussion see infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.
- 130 and accompanying text.
64
As a result of this, two new 2 or 3-level independent variables were created
65
ANOVA is a very common statistical technique, which aims to identify the sources of variance
among participants. In our design, the purpose of the statistical analysis is to examine whether the
experimental groups are different from each other. The procedure allows us to tell how much of the
difference between participants could be attributed to the assignment to the different sub-groups. In
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checked separately, were the six attitude variables.66 The independent variables were
the following: a) the entity that received the payment, and b) the certainty of the
payment and time of that payment.67 Table 2 presents the means and standard
deviations of each of the variables, divided by the six sub-groups.68 Following the
table we describe the findings of the ANOVAs performed for each variable
separately.
TABLE 2: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF ALL MEASURED DEPENDENT VARIABLES DIVIDED BY
THE IDENTITY OF THE RECIPIENT, CERTAINTY OF THE PAYMENT AND ITS TIMING

Variable
Unethical
Appropriateness
Personal Gain
Legality
Perception
Compliance
Entitlement

Ex Ante
Certain
M
SD
4.59 3.11
6.10 3.06
6.27 3.24
3.42 2.63

State
Post
Certain
M
SD
6.12 3.01
4.53 2.79
4.97 2.89
8.19 2.42

Post
Probable
M
SD
7.06 2.35
4.78 2.79
5.06 2.66
8.45 2.23

Ex Ante
Certain
M
SD
4.17 2.58
6.54 2.56
6.53 2.11
3.74 2.60

Individual
Post
Certain
M
SD
5.04 2.38
5.79 2.60
6.27 2.79
5.23 3.08

Post
Probable
M
SD
6.40 2.70
5.39 2.84
5.45 3.15
6.34 3.24

5.03
6.60

3.94
7.71

4.41
7.97

6.12
7.02

5.70
7.14

4.77
7.85

3.27
2.64

2.80
2.13

3.07
1.70

2.54
1.84

3.09
1.97

3.09
1.81

1) Un-ethicality
The measure of un-ethicality and the next measure of appropriateness both
focus on the perception of the morality of producing the fertilizer in a given legal
payment setting. We first examined the between-group perceived level of unethicality of fertilizer production.69 In the analysis of variance a significant70
difference was found between the averages based on the identity of the party
receiving the payment.71 The average of the individual was significantly lower than
the average of the state.72 That is to say, when the payment was made to the

plain words, the statistical analyses will tell us how much of the differences in the responses of
participants could be explained by the framing of the legal payment.
66
Dependent variable refers to the variables that are explained by the model. In our context, the
dependent variables are participants' attitudes toward the production of the fertilizer.
67
Independent variable refers to the variable that is manipulated in the model in order to measure the
effects of the manipulation on the dependent variable. In our context, the independent variables are the
various legal regimes we described in the questionnaire.
68
Standard Deviation (SD) is a common concept used to measure the distribution of a variable around
the average.
69
Ratings for the variable of perceived un-ethicality of fertilizer production (UNETHICAL) ranged
from 1 = fertilizer production within the described legal framework is not unethical, and 10 = fertilizer
production within the described legal framework is unethical. Table 2 presents the averages and
standard deviations (in parentheses) of the variable of un-ethicality judgment of fertilizer production
according to the sum-receiving entity (state and individual) and the time of payment and amount of
certainty.
70
Significance in statistics refers to the odds that a certain result was created by chance. In the context
of this paper, every time a difference or a result is presented as Significant, it means that there is less
than 5% likelihood that this difference was coincidental. The 5% level of significance is a common
threshold used in statistical analysis. In some cases where the result was stronger we added p < .01 to
imply that the likelihood of a chance driven result was lower than 1%.
71
F(1, 387) = 6.81, p < .01, 2 = .02
72
The results of the individual were M=5.30, SD = 2.71, while the results of the state were M=5.92,
SD=3.01.
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individual, judgment of fertilizer production un-ethicality was lower than when the
payment was made to the state.
Similarly, a significant difference was found in the ANOVA between the time
of payment and the certainty of payment,73 where the average of group 1 (ex-ante
certain) was the lowest, after which comes the average of group 2 (ex-post certain)
and the average of group 3 (ex-post uncertain).74 In the Duncan Post-Hoc Tests,75
significant differences were found between the groups. That is to say, when the
payment was certain and before hand, un-ethicality judgments were the lowest.
Shifting payments to after the fact caused a rise in un-ethicality judgments, and
adding a dimension of uncertainty to the payment caused another rise in unethicality.76

Estimated Marginal Means of Un-ethicality

Estimated Marginal Means

7.5
7.0
6.5

State

6.0
5.5

Individual

5.0
4.5
4.0
1.00

2.00

3.00

1 = Ex -Ante 2 = Post-Certain 3 = Post-Probable

Explanation for the graph (applicable to all of the following graphs)
1. Certain payment and in advance (groups 1 and 2; heretofore, Ex Ante), in the legal situation in which
payment for the spillage is certain and paid in advance.
2. Certain payment and after the fact (groups 3 and 5; heretofore, Ex Post Certain), in the legal situation in
which payment for the spillage is certain and paid after the fact.
3. Uncertain payment and after the fact (groups 4 and 6; heretofore, Ex Post Probable), in the legal situation
in which payment for the spillage is uncertain and paid in after the fact.
73

F(2, 387)=24.82, p<.001, 2=.11
The average of group 1 (ex-ante certain) (M=4.40, SD=2.88); Group 2 (ex-post certain) (M=5.59,
SD=2.76); Group 3 (ex-post uncertain) (M=6.72, SD=2.55).
75
Post–Hoc tests are used to identify the source of variance when more than one possibility exists. For
example, when an effect of variable with three levels is significant, one needs to do a post-hoc test to
identify which of the difference between the levels is responsible for the existence of a significant
difference. Unless mentioned otherwise, the post-hoc test we chose to use in this paper is called
Duncan.
76
No significant interaction was found between the variable of un-ethicality judgment of fertilizer
production (spillage) and the payment recipient (state, individual) in time of payment and certainty of
payment (p>.05). That is to say, the differences that were found between averages of state and
individual in the variable of un-ethicality judgment of fertilizer production (spillage) were not related
to time or certainty of payment.
74
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2) Appropriateness
We next turn to examine the differences between groups in the variable of
judgment of fitting market behavior (APPROPRIATENESS).77 In the analysis of
variance, a significant difference was found between the averages of the variable of
payment recipient,78 where the average of state was significantly lower than the
average of the individual.79 That is to say, the appropriateness of production was
judged to be lower when the state was the payment recipient compared to the
experimental groups where the individual was the payment recipient. Similarly, a
significant difference was found in the ANOVA between the averages of the variable
of timing and certainty of payment80, where the average of group 3 (Ex Post Probable)
was the lowest, after which came group 2 (Ex Post Certain), followed by group 1 (Ex
Ante Certain)81 In the Post-Hoc Tests, it was found that the averages of group 2 and 3
were significantly lower82 than the average of group 1. In other words, shifting the
payment to after the fact caused participants to perceive production as a less
appropriate choice.83

77

The range of ratings in the variable of judgment of fitting market behavior in fertilizer production
(APPROPRIATENESS) ranged from 1 = fertilizer production within the described legal situation is
inappropriate market behavior, to 10 = fertilizer production within the described legal situation is
appropriate market behavior. Table 2 presents the averages and standard deviations of the variable of
judgment of fitting market behavior in fertilizer production according to payment recipient, time of
payment, and certainty of payment.
78
F(1,386)=7.49, p<.01, 02= 2.
79
The results of the state were M=5.15, SD=2.95 while the results of the individual were M=5.87,
SD=2.71.
80
F(2,386)=7.88, p<.001 2=.04.
81
The average of group 1 (ex-ante certain) (M=6.30, SD=2.84); Group 2 (ex-post certain) (M=5.16,
SD=2.76); Group 3 (ex-post uncertain) (M=5.09, SD=2.82).
82
p<.05
83
No significant interaction was found for the variables of judgment of fitting market behavior
regarding fertilizer production, according to payment recipient (state, individual) and time and certainty
of payment (p>.05). That is to say, the differences found between averages of state and individual for
judgment of fitting market behavior, were not related to time or certainty of payment.
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Estimated Marginal Means of Appropriateness

Estimated Marginal Means
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3.00

1 = Ex -Ante 2 = Post-Certain 3 = Post-Probable

3) Personal Gain
The third measure examined the differences between groups in the variable of
judgment of the perceived personal gain in producing the fertilizer (PERSONAL
GAIN).84 This item prompted participants to judge on instrumental grounds, whether
engaging in that behavior and paying the legal payment is a rational move. In the
analysis of variance, a significant difference was found between the averages of the
variable of payment recipient source,85 where the average of state was significantly
lower than the average of the individual.86 That is to say, when the state was presented
as the payment recipient judgment of personal gain in production was lower than the
individual was presented as the payment source. Similarly, the ANOVA revealed a
significant difference between the averages of time and certainty of payment87, where
the average of group 3 (Ex Post Probable) was the lowest, the next highest was group
2 (Ex Post Certain) and the next was group 1 (Ex Ante, Certain).88 Post Hoc Tests
revealed that the averages of group 2 and 3 were significantly lower than the average
of group 1.89 That is to say, in the legal situation in which payment was Ex Post

84

The range of ratings for the variable of judgment of the perceived personal gain in producing the
fertilizer (PERSONAL GAIN) ranged from 1 = fertilizer production within the described legal situation
is not a personally gainful step, and 10 = fertilizer production within the described legal situation is a
personally gainful step. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the
variable of judgment of the perceived personal gain in producing the fertilizer, as a function of the
payment recipient source and time and certainty of payment.
85
F(1,384)=5.07, p<.05, 2=.01.
86
The average of state was (M=5.43, SD=2.98) and the average of the individual was (M=6.04,
SD=2.78).
87
F(2,384)=5.42 p<.01, 2=.03.
88
The average of group 3 (Ex Post Probable) (M=5.26, SD=2.91); group 2 (Ex Post Certain) (M=5.61,
SD=2.91) and group 1 (Ex Ante, Certain) (M=6.39, SD=2.77).
89
P<.05.
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Probable or Ex Post Certain, fertilizer production was judged to be less personally
gainful than when the legal situation was Ex Ante Certain.90

Estimated Marginal Means of Personal Gain
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4) Perception of Legality
The Fourth measure examined the differences between groups for variable of
judgment of perceived unlawfulness of fertilizer production (PERCEPTION of
LEGALITY).91 The purpose of this measure was to examine, whether participants
viewed the legal payment as legitimizing their behavior, and making it in accordance
with the law. The ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the averages of
the variable of payment recipient,92 where the average of the individual was
significantly lower than average of the state.93 That is to say, when the individual was
presented as the payment recipient, subjects judged production to be more lawful than
when the state was presented as the payment recipient. Similarly, the ANOVA
revealed a significant difference between the averages of timing and certainty of
payment,94 where the average of group 1 (Ex Ante Certain) was lowest, after which
came the average of group 2 (Ex Post Certain) and after that the average of group 3
90

No significant interaction was found for the variable of judgment of personal gain in producing the
fertilizer, according to payment recipient (state, individual) and time and certainty of payment (p>.05).
That is to say, the differences found between averages of state and individual for judgment of personal
gain in producing the fertilizer were not related to time or certainty of payment.
91
The range of ratings for the variable of judgment of perceived unlawfulness of fertilizer production
(LEGALITY PERCEPTION) ranged from 1 = fertilizer production within the described legal situation
is lawful, and 10 = fertilizer production within the described legal situation is unlawful. Table 1
presents the averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the variable of judgment of perceived
unlawfulness of fertilizer production as a function of the payment recipient source and time and
certainty of payment.
92
F(1,380)=28.85, p<.001, 2=.07.
93
The average of the individual was (M=5.19, SD=3.18) and the average of the state was (M=6.59,
SD=3.44).
94
F(2,380)=76.62, p<.001, 2=.29.
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(Ex Post Probable).95 Post Hoc Tests revealed that the average of group 1 was
significantly lower than the averages of group 2 and 3, which were not significantly
different. In other words, shifting the payment to after the fact caused participants to
perceive production as less lawful.
In contrast to all other measures, a significant interaction96 was found for the
variable of perceived unlawfulness of production and payment recipient according to
time and certainty of payment.97 It appears that for group 1 (Ex Ante Certain) a
significant difference was not found between the averages of state and individual.98
However, significant differences between state and individual were found for group 2
(Ex Post Certain),99 and group 3 (Ex Post Probable), for which the averages of state
were significantly higher than the averages of individual. The pattern of findings
shows that the perception of lawfulness of production when the individual is
presented as the payment recipient is higher than when the state is presented as the
payment recipient. These disparities were only found when the payment was Ex Post
Certain or Ex Post Probable, but not when it was Ex Ante Certain.100

Estimated Marginal Means of Perceived Legality
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95

The average of group 1 (Ex Ante Certain) (M=3.42, SD=2.62); group 2 (Ex Post Certain) (M=6.77,
SD=3.12); group 3 (Ex Post Probable) (M=7.39, SD=2.97).
96
The meaning of an interaction between the recipient and the time and certainty is that the differences
that were found between the averages of state and individual in the variable of perceived unlawfulness
of production were moderated by the conditions of time and certainty of payment. The question of who
received the money affected the importance of timing and certainty to the perceived unlawfulness of
the production.
97
F(2,380)=14.33, p<.001, 2=.07.
98
F(1,380)=1.44, p>.05, 2=.00.
99
F(1,380)=36.29, p<.001, 2=.09.
100
The analysis demonstrates that there are significant differences between the averages of all three
groups for time and certainty of payment, between when the payment recipient is the state
F(2,380)=80.68, p<.001, 2=.30, and when the payment recipient is the individual F(2,380)=14.41,
p<.001, 2=.07, where the strength of effect was more pronounced in the former.
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5) Intention to Produce
The fifth measure was related to the differences between groups for the
variable of intention to produce compliance to fertilizer production (comply).101
Intention to behave was shown in many previous studies to be the best proxy for
behavior,102 and hence in the context of this study it is the closest approximation of
people's actual behavior. The ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the
averages of the payment recipient,103 where the average of the state was significantly
lower than the average of the individual.104 That is to say, when the state was
presented as the payment recipient, subjects were less willing to produce the fertilizer
compared to when the individual was presented as the payment recipient.
Similarly, the ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the averages
of timing and certainty of payment,105 where the average of group 3 (Ex Post
Probable) was the lowest, after which came group 2 (Ex Post Certain) followed by the
average of group 1 (Ex Ante Certain).106 The Post Hoc Tests revealed that the average
of group 3 was significantly lower than group 1. The average of group 2 was not
significantly different than the other groups. In other words, shifting from an ex ante
regime to an ex post probabilistic regime reduced the amount of participants willing
to engage in production.107

101

The range of scores for the variable of compliance to fertilizer production ranged from 1 = I would
try not to produce the fertilizer within the described legal situation, to 10 = I would try to produce the
fertilizer within the described legal situation. Table 1 displays the averages and standard deviations (in
parentheses) of the variable of compliance to fertilizer production, as a function of the payment
recipient source and time and certainty of payment.
102
See Icek Ajzen, From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior, in ACTION-CONTROL:
FROM COGNITION TO BEHAVIOR 11 (J. Kuhl & J. Beckman eds, 1985).
103
F(1,384)=12.43, p<.001, 2=.03.
104
The average of the state was (M=4.46, SD=3.08) and the average of the individual was (M=5.48,
SD=2.98).
105
F(2,384)=3.78 p<.05, 2=.02.
106
The average of group 1 (Ex Ante Certain) (M=5.53, SD=3.00); group 2 (Ex Post Certain) (M=4.81,
SD=3.07); group 3 (Ex Post Probable) (M=4.59, SD=3.08).
107
No significant interaction was found for the variable of judgment of compliance to fertilizer
production, according to payment recipient (state, individual) and time and certainty of payment
(p>.05). That is to say, the differences found between the averages of state and individual for
willingness to comply were not related to time or certainty of payment.
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Estimated Marginal Means of Compliance
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6) Entitlement
The sixth measure examined the differences between groups for the variable
of demanding a high price for fertilizer production (ENTITLEMENT).108 This
measure attempts to capture participants’ overall dislike for engaging in the
production in each legal setting. Hence, asking for a higher price represents their
willingness to pay for not engaging in this practice. The ANOVA revealed no
significant differences between the averages for the variable of payment recipient.
However, the ANOVA did reveal a significant difference between the averages of the
variable of time and certainty of payment,109 where the average of group 1 (Ex Ante
Certain) was the lowest, after which came group 2 (Ex Post Certain), followed by
group 3 (Ex Post Probable).110 The Post Hoc Tests revealed that the average group 1
was significantly lower than group 2 and 3, which were not significantly different
from one another. In other words, demand for an especially high price in return for
production was lower when the legal payment was made ex ante.111

108

The range of scores for the variable of ENTITLEMENT ranged from 1 = I would refrain from
asking for a high price for producing the fertilizer within the described legal situation, to 10 = I would
ask for a high price for producing the fertilizer within the described legal situation. Table 1 displays the
averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the variable of ENTITLEMENT, as a function of
the payment recipient source and time and certainty of payment.
109
F(2,380)=9.44, p<.001, 2=.05.
110
The average of group 1 (Ex Ante Certain) (M=6.79, SD=2.31); group 2 (Ex Post Certain) (M=7.42,
SD=2.06); group 3 (Ex Post Probable) (M=7.91, SD=1.75).
111
No significant interaction was found for the variable of ENTITLEMENT, according to payment
recipient (state, individual) and time and certainty of payment (p>.05). That is to say, the differences
found between averages of state and individual for demand of an especially high payment for
producing the fertilizer were not related to time or certainty of payment.
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Estimated Marginal Means of Entitlement
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B. Summary of the Results
In contrast to rational choice predictions, we found that the structure of legal
payments is of importance. The identity of the party receiving the payment, the timing
in which it is made, and the certainty with which it is assessed, were all found to be
related to most measured variables.
Identity of recipient - In all 6 measures, participants preferred a situation in
which the payment was made to an individual rather than to the state. Overall, people
thought this setting was more moral, and that production in it was more socially and
legally acceptable. Perhaps most importantly, participants were more likely to
produce the fertilizer in this situation. However, the difference was not significant
regarding the price participants would ask for producing the fertilizer.
Timing of payment - A strong and significant difference existed between
paying ex-ante and ex-post (both probable and certain). Participants thought it was
more moral, and more socially and legally acceptable to produce the fertilizer when
they made the payment ex-ante. Furthermore, participants were interested in a smaller
profit for production in the ex ante condition compared with the ex-post condition.112
Certainty of payment - In all six measures, participants demonstrated a dislike
for probabilistic payments. In five of the six measures it was significantly different
from the ex-ante group, and not from the ex-post certain group. However, with regard
to the measure of intention, participants differed significantly from the ex-post certain
group, implying that when the payment was not certain they were less likely to
produce the fertilizer when compared with the situation where the payment was
certain.

112

The only exception was when the dependent variable was intention; in that case the ex-ante group
differed significantly only from the third group of ex-post probable.
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Interaction between identity of the recipient and timing of the payment - A
significant interaction emerged regarding the perception of legality. There was a
difference between ex-post and ex-ante when the state was the recipient. However,
when the individual was the recipient, there was no such difference. This pattern was
also evident in some of the other measures (e.g. entitlement), but only with a
marginally significant interaction. Thus, we found some evidence that the importance
of the timing was stronger when the recipient was the state.
III.

DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In this Section, we turn to explore the implications of our findings to legal
policy making. First, we tie the findings of Section II to the theoretical literature
reviewed in Section I. We then suggest several policy implications resulting from
these findings. Due to the preliminary nature of this study, our suggestions in this
regard will be tentative rather than definitive. Finally, we point out the limitations of
our study, and outline future research that could help overcome some of these
limitations.
1. Are Fines Prices?
In this article, we documented consistent and robust differences between legal
payments due to their structure. This result runs against traditional economic theory
that assumes that all legal payments are fungible. Thus, our findings suggest that the
"fines are prices" paradigm should be revisited, and refined along the three
dimensions we studied.
First, much like in other settings, people like certainty and dislike uncertainty
with respect to legal payments.113 Our study demonstrated that people perceived
probabilistic payments as less moral and less acceptable than certain payments.
Furthermore, participants were less willing to engage in harm creating activity when a
probabilistic element was added to equal legal payments. This result confirms our
hypothesis and that of others writing on the deterrent effect of ambiguity.114 However,
while this effect was consistent across all measures, it was not significant in all of
them. The lack of significance across all measures might be explained by the fact that
rational individuals are expected to strictly prefer the probabilistic option, given the
fact that we held the size of the sanction constant. Thus, our finding in this measure
could be interpreted as more powerful than might be suggested. Finally we note that
our findings do not allow us to decipher what is driving them, since both cognitive
biases associated with uncertainty aversion and the expressive meaning of
probabilistic sanctions might be in place.

113

See Shawn P. Curley, J. Frank Yates & Richard A. Abrams, Psychological Sources of Ambiguity
Avoidance, 38 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES, 230 (1986). ,Hillel J. Einhorn
& Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference, 92 PSYCH. REV. 433
(1985). Craig R. Fox & Martin Weber, Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance, and Decision
Context, 88 ORG. BEHAV.& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES. 476 (2002).
114
Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on The
Neglected Role Of Uncertainty In Deterring Crime 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 276 (1999); Uzi Segal &
Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (2006).

22

Second, our findings demonstrate the significance of the timing of payment. In
accordance with our predictions, paying before the harmful act rather than after it
reduced the negative perception of the payment and increased the willingness of
people to engage in harmful activity. This result follows the connection we drew
between the paradigmatic structure of a price and the way in which legal payments are
structured. In the private setting, ex ante payments could imply consent that was
granted in return for the legal payment, thereby justifying the act. Ex post payments to
individuals, on the other hand, do not imply consent, and therefore sustain the
perception of the act being forbidden. In the context of the state, ex ante payments
give saliency to the unique role of the state as a legitimate source of authority.
Numerous studies of social psychology have documented the unique power of the
state in securing obedience.115 This power was tested even in extreme cases such as
torture.116 Thus, paying the state in advance and getting a license from it might be
especially appealing for participants. Ex post payments to the state, however, employ
the ability of state sanctions to shape people's moral reasoning and perception of
wrongdoing. When such a payment is given to the state, it brings some greater moral
appeal and social labeling against engaging in that behavior, increasing its impact
above the cost of paying the sanction.117 This dimension of state based sanctions was
confirmed in various empirical studies that focused on the moral effect of formal
sanctions.118
Third, in accordance with our predictions, people were more willing to engage
in harmful behavior when the individual harmed by the act, rather than a third party,
received the payment. This result suggests that the framing of a payment as
compensation implies a different social meaning. Compensation brings the parties
closer to the paradigmatic price, especially in cases where the losses suffered by the
injured party are purely monetary. It removes (to a certain degree) the harm caused to
the injured party from the decision making calculus, thus allowing individuals to
consider their personal benefit.
Finally, the interaction between the identity of recipient and the time and
certainty of payment provides additional support for the fine is a price paradigm.119 A
post hoc analysis that followed the interaction demonstrated that when the state was
the recipient, the timing had a greater effect on the attitudes of the participants in
comparison to when the recipient of the payment was the individual. Since many
115
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paradigmatic prices are paid in advance (e.g., the classic spot market transaction),
while fines are usually paid after the fact, it was expected that people would be more
willing to engage in production when the payment was done in advance. However,
because it is easier to view the payment as a fine when the state is the recipient of the
payment, the effect of timing is likely to have a stronger effect in those scenarios than
when the individual is the recipient. Furthermore, when the state is the recipient of the
payment, shifting it ex ante is of greater significance, since it transforms the situation
in to one in which the individual acts in complete compliance with the law. Hence, the
timing of the payment should receive greater attention by policymakers when the
recipient of the payment is the state.
To sum up, there appears to be a continuum of legal payments that are
perceived differently by people, and as a result generate distinct incentives. At one
end of this continuum lie legal payments that are similar in structure to a paradigmatic
price. These are payments made to another private party in advance. At the other end
of the continuum lie legal payments that are similar in structure to the paradigmatic
punishment. These are payments that are made after the fact to the state, and that their
assessment is probabilistic. As legal payments shift from the price side of the
continuum to the punishment side of it, people begin to see the payment triggering
activity as less moral, and as a result they are less willing to engage in it.
2. Choosing Between Alternative Legal Regimes
So law does matter. Legal payments are not mere prices, and the choice
between them may affect the way in which people behave. That given, we turn to
review some of the implications of our findings for the design of optimal legal rules.
At the outset we would like to emphasize that due to the preliminary nature of our
project, our suggestions should not be read as definitive calls for swift legal reform.
Rather, we attempt to point out several policy debates that should be revisited both
theoretically and empirically in light of our findings.
The general implication of our work is that when policymakers choose
between legal regimes they not only set monetary consequences for different types of
behavior, but also determine how people will perceive those consequences. While
some legal payments are perceived as prices and therefore encourage people to
conduct cost benefit analyses, others exclude such considerations from peoples’
decisions. Thus, the choice between different modes of payment should focus on
whether policymakers want to encourage non-compliance in cases in which the
benefit people derive from the activity is larger than the legal payment. If
policymakers aim to promote efficiency, and can set legal payments such that they
capture the full social harm caused by the harmful activity, there is a clear advantage
in framing legal payments as prices. In these cases, our analysis would support exante payments made to the parties harmed by the act. These payments would help
crowd out people's intrinsic motivation not to harm others, and cause them to engage
in the harm-generating behavior, as long as it is beneficial for them to do so. If, on
the other hand, policymakers aim to reduce harmful activity notwithstanding its
efficiency, they should consider framing the payment as far away from prices as
possible, making the payment probabilistic, succeeding the harmful activity, and
without reference to compensation. Such framing could create additional deterrence
without increasing the size of the payment. This could be especially useful when
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political forces limit the ability to raise sanctions or when harm doers have limited
resources.
Pollution is a classic example of a harmful activity that we want people to
engage in if the benefits arising from it outweigh its harms.120 Policymakers tend to
recognize that command and control regulation might create inefficiencies that
environmental taxes can prevent.121 Our findings confirm this assertion, and
demonstrate that pollution taxes could encourage people to conduct cost benefit
analyses.122 Furthermore, our results could inform the optimal design of pollution
taxes in a way that will increase the chance that people view it as a price. For
example, making sure that people realize that the tax compensates the individuals
harmed by pollution will increase the chance that they view it as a price. Indeed,
several scholars have attacked some of the underlying rationales of pollution taxes,
suggesting that emission taxes be used to compensate those who are harmed by
pollution,123 yet they have focused on the distributive arguments rather than on
behavioral analysis. Similarly, the certainty of detection is also important to prevent
an association with fines. Employing new technological tools that will assure
complete detection will cause polluters to perceive the taxes they pay as mere prices.
The results offer an additional perspective to the current debate regarding the
behavioral effects of environmental regulation. Some have argued that the effect of
taxation on behavior is contingent upon the size of the tax.124 Large and small taxes
would reduce pollution while intermediate taxation would crowd out intrinsic
motivation, while not suggesting a costly enough incentive to abstain from polluting.
In that regard, Frey calls for the use of other means of regulation with a more limited
crowding out effect. Others have argued that the predictions of Frey are uninformative
since they fail to account for numerous factors related to the framing of the payments
(e.g., tax versus subsidy, etc.).125 Based on the findings accumulated in this paper, it is
safe to say that the perspective taken by Frey is indeed unsatisfactory, as it focuses on
the size of the payment as the sole factor which would moderate the level of crowding
120
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out. Frey’s model ignores the importance of factors such as certainty, timing and
identity of who receives the money. In a real-life context, there is a limit to the
magnitude of payment a state can request from individuals and hence the importance
of how the payment is framed could be an effective policy tool. 126
Turning to the issue of uncertainty, the findings reported in this study imply a
conclusion that runs against the conventional wisdom of enforcement. The
comparison between the probabilistic groups and the certain groups showed that
raising the probability of detection to 100% while holding the size of the sanction
constant could cause more people to behave in a harmful manner. Thus, contrary to
the prediction of rational choice theory, that any increase in the probability of
detection will also increase deterrence, our results suggest that the unique shift to
certain payments might actually reduce deterrence because it will change the social
meaning of the sanction. Take for instance the issue of the enforcement of traffic
laws. Current technology allows regulators to detect some violations of these laws
with complete certainty using a combination of “black boxes” and GPS.127 Rental
companies have already used this technology in order to fine customers who drove
their cars above the speed limit.128 While traditional analysis would suggest that
utilizing such technology will necessarily increase compliance (or allow for a
reduction of the level of sanctions), our analysis suggests that shifting to a regime in
which sanctions are 100% certain might cause people to be more willing to engage in
cost-benefit analysis, bringing about lower compliance.129 Consequently, in such
situations, there is a need to increase the magnitude of the payment in order to sustain
a given level of deterrence.
3. Limitations of the Current Study and Suggestions for Further
Refinements
In this final subsection, we evaluate the potential criticisms to this project. We
outline the limitations of our results, and along the way sketch out additional research
that can help deal with these limitations, thus deepening our understanding of legal
payments.
The first limitation of the results is the high standard deviation measured for
participants' price request estimations (asked in return for their agreement to produce
the fertilizer), and therefore this measure did not yield significant differences between
the sub-groups of the sample. This large variation in people's responses might be
126
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related to the difficulties people faced when they attempted to make an estimation of a
price with such limited information. Future research could try to deal with this
problem by giving participants more detailed information about the circumstances of
the case. Such additional information could improve the ability of participants to give
more accurate estimates of the price they would be willing to pay in such
circumstances.130
A second limitation might be seen in the strong feelings of social desirability
that may have been evoked by the selected experimental scenario. Indeed, participants
in our study were requested to admit what amounts to their willingness to profit at the
expense of others. This fact might have a greater effect on answers regarding the
identity of the recipient, since in that case people might feel that it would look better
if they are willing to produce the fertilizer only when they compensate the damaged
party. With regard to the timing of the payment and the probability of detection, the
social desirability effect might still exist, but is expected to be weaker, as choices are
more equal in their perceived desirability.
A third limitation of our study might stem from the way in which we chose to
describe the harm caused. Our experimental setting was a unique case where a clear
victim existed, both when the payment was made to the state and when the payment
was made to the individual. In many real world cases, however, there is no
identifiable victim, and one can only identify a group of people of whom only some
were harmed by the act (e.g., the factory causing a probabilistic harm to a neighboring
village). In these contexts, locating an individual victim and making a direct payment
to her, might work in the reverse direction, making people more resistant to view the
payment as satisfactory. Along those lines, our findings should not be generalized to
situations in which the harm cannot be quantified or fully compensated.131 For
instance, in most bodily harm cases, it is extremely complicated to measure the harm
precisely and to fully compensate for it. Furthermore, even when only property
damage is at stake, many real settings involve numerous victims with a large variety
of damages. In such cases, the move from fines to prices is expected to be more
complicated. While, as we argue above, in such cases we might want to prevent a
transformation from fines to prices, it is essential to explore experimentally the
perception of people in such settings, and examine whether the pattern we presented
in this study is replicated.
A fourth limitation comes as a result of the fact that participants were asked to
make a business-like decision in which one business entity harms another. One should
be careful not to generalize from the selected business-like setting to all types of
disputes, since our setting may have signaled to participants a need to employ a
calculative approach, rather than a moral or emotional one. Arguably, in more private
settings (e.g., a neighbor dispute), people might tend to employ such perspectives
when evaluating legal payments. For instance, Baker documented substantial
differences between the way tort victims treat money they receive from liability

130

Nonetheless, as explained earlier, we measured on a Likert scale participants’ estimation of the
magnitude of the sum they would request [entitlement], this measure was intended to captures the same
behavioral estimate.
131
For a review of the incommensurability literature and its implications to our study see supra notes
59-62.

27

insurance companies and money they receive directly from tortfeasors.132 With
respect to the first, victims clearly aim to maximize the amount of payments they
receive.133 With respect to the second, however, social norms labeling this money as
“blood money” limit (actually, almost eliminate) its value, causing victims not to
pursue compensation from “real people.”134 Hence, future research should examine
whether changing the setting impacts the pattern, which was evident in this case.
A fifth limitation was caused by the fact that all payments made to a third
party in our study were made to the state. However, payments to the state create two
effects, which are hard to separate in a single comparison: (a) the victim is not being
compensated, and (b) the expressive power of the state is at work. Situations in which
the third party collecting the payment is not the state (e.g. a trade association) might
bring about different results. For example, Baker documented differences between the
way people treat money paid to insurance companies and money paid to victims of
tortuous acts.135 In that sense, paying an insurance company creates an ideal
intermediate category, where the individual is not getting paid on one hand, and the
state's expressive power is not being triggered on the other. Future research should
test all three scenarios on one subject, allowing for greater isolation of each of the
effects that are unique to the individual and the state.
Additionally, our questionnaire did not attempt to control for the size of the
payment. Much of the crowding out literature has argued that the magnitude of this
effect could depend on the size of the monetary incentives being used. Frey, for
example, has argued that there is a U-shaped connection between the size of the
incentive and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation, such that crowding out is
strongest with intermediate payments.136 Thus, controlling for the size of the payment
is expected to interact with the tendency of people to view the payment as a price, and
their willingness to engage in harm-generating behavior.
Finally, one should recognize the general limitations of the methodology we
employed. Measured items were basically attitude scales. Given the extensive
literature on the complexity of the attitude-behavior relationship,137 one ought to be
careful not to over-state these findings. Future research should attempt to combine
other methodological approaches with additional types for proxies of behavior.138
That said, it should also be recognized that numerous studies have documented the
validity of using intention as a proxy for behavior.139 Thus, we expect that the current
pattern of findings should be replicated using other methodologies.
A separate set of questions that we leave for future research relates to how the
legal framing of payments affects the behavior of the recipients. Our study was
motivated by the view of legal payments as prices, and therefore focused exclusively
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on the paying side of the legal equation. However, distinct legal payments could have
different meaning for the receiving side as well. For example, aiding the poor through
the tax system or through private law could create different motivations on the side of
the receiving party, even if they receive identical sums of money. The traditional
economic approach to the question of which type of redistributive tool is superior is
that the tax and transfer system is the most efficient way to redistribute wealth since
income taxes only create inefficiencies associated with distorted work incentives
while redistributive private law rules create the same distortions regarding work, and
additional distortions with respect to the activity that they regulate.140 Recently,
Lewinsohn-Zamir has argued that once the fungibility assumption is relaxed and we
acknowledge that there could be differences between dollars received from the tax
and transfer system and those received through private law, the use of private law in
order to redistribute wealth could be justified from a consequentialist perspective.141
Nonetheless, this theoretical conclusion was based on behavioral studies that did not
explore the unique nuances of legal payments. A complete theory of efficient
redistribution should follow along the lines we set in this study, and explore the
differences between different types of redistributive legal payments.
Our results also suggest an array of potential studies in the area of optimal
contract design. For instance, our findings offer an additional perspective on the
choice made by contracting parties between liquidating damages in the contract and
relying on courts to determine them after the breach has occurred. While we do not
disagree with the existing literature outlining the different considerations relevant to
this choice,142 we find it incomplete in the sense that it treats liquidated damages and
court determined damages as fungible. Our analysis suggests, however, that liquidated
damages might be perceived differently by the potential breaching party. The fact that
liquidated damages are set ex ante might cause potential breachers to view them as a
payment that is closer to a price.143 Thus, all things being equal, contracting parties
are expected to be more willing to breach and pay damages when damages are set
prior to the breach.
Given the price nexus between contracting parties, a contract design that
promotes additional breaches is desirable from their perspective since it could help
promote efficient breaches during the performance of the contract. As long as
damages are liquidated such that they reflect the full cost of breach, all breaches
enlarge the size of the contractual pie. Case in point, the fine imposed in the day care
center that Gneezy and Rustichini studied. Arguably, in such a setting one can easily
calculate the harm caused by parents coming in late, which mostly consists of the
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value of the time of the employees who are required to stay in late. The introduction
of the fine could assist the day care center and the parents in reaching an efficient
outcome by capturing the surplus between the value of the time of late parents and the
value of the time of the day care center’s employees.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We began this study with a question: are all 'legal dollars' created equal? And
we end it with an answer: no, they are not. We identified three structural
characteristics of legal payments that create consistent differences between them: the
identity of the party receiving the payment, the timing in which it is made, and the
certainty in which it is assessed. The shift between the different payments gradually
transforms prices into punishments, and changes the way people treat legal payments.
This result runs against the fundamental assumption of economic analysis of law that
all legal payments are fungible. We then demonstrated that relaxing this assumption
suggests that an array of policy debates ranging from environmental regulation to law
enforcement should be revisited in order to fully understand the effects of legal
regimes that seem to be equivalent from an economic perspective.
While the results we present are robust, in the sense that they demonstrate
differences between legal payments, one should note that this study has explored a
point not studied before, and that there is much more work to be done before we fully
understand the differences we documented. Thus, we cannot offer at this point a
comprehensive theory explaining the differences between all legal payments in every
conceivable context. In order to progress towards development of such a theory, we
offered several suggestions for future research that could help broaden our
understanding of the distinctions between legal payments. Undoubtedly, deciphering
the social meaning of legal dollars is a tricky task. If one intends to utilize law in an
optimal fashion, it is an essential task as well.
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APPENDIX A – METHODOLOGY

QUESTIONNAIRE
Attitude Survey
The following survey is designed to test your attitudes regarding legislation on
dumping chemicals into Israeli lakes.
Generic Scenario:
Assume that you own a fertilizer factory located adjacent to a small lake. You
recently received an order for fertilizer, which the factory has not previously
produced. It will cost the factory 200,000 Shekels [around $50,000] to produce the
order. Producing this particular fertilizer also involves dumping a new kind of
chemical into the lake. The only effect of dumping this chemical into the lake will be
to raise the production expenses of a neighboring fertilizer factory, which is also
located at the edge of the same lake. With the exception of the neighboring factory,
the lake water is not used by anyone else. Additionally, the new chemical does not
cause any medical problems or damage to the environment.
Manipulation A: ex-ante-state
By law, before dumping the new chemical into the lake, you must pay a license fee of
100,000 Shekels (around $25,000). You cannot purchase the raw materials needed to
make the new chemical without presenting the permit attained by paying this fee.
With the exception of paying this fee, you do not anticipate any other expenses.
Manipulation B: ex-ante-individual
By law, before dumping the new chemical into the lake, you must pay the neighboring
factory a sum of 100,000 Shekels (around $25,000). You will be able to purchase the
raw materials needed to make the new chemical only after presenting a permit
showing that the neighboring factory received the aforementioned payment. With the
exception of paying this fee, you do not anticipate any other expenses.
Manipulation C: ex-post-individual-certain
By law, after dumping the new chemical into the lake, the neighboring factory can sue
you for the resultant increase in his production expenses. There is no question that the
neighboring factory will notice that you dumped the chemical, take you to court, and
win the lawsuit. The anticipated cost of the lawsuit is 100,000 Shekels (around
$25,000). With the exception of paying this fee, you do not anticipate any other
expenses.
Manipulation D: ex-post-individual-probabilistic
By law, after dumping the new chemical into the lake, the neighboring factory can sue
you for the resultant increase in its production expenses. If the neighboring factory
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notices that you have dumped this new chemical into the lake, and if it sues you, the
anticipated cost of the lawsuit is 100,000 Shekels (around $25,000). That said, the
possibility exists that the neighboring factory will not notice that you have dumped
the chemical, and you will therefore not have to pay anything. With the exception of
the possibility of paying this fee, you do not anticipate any other expenses.
Manipulation E: ex-post-state-certain
By law, anyone who dumps a new chemical into the lake will be fined 100,000
Shekels (around $25,000) by the municipal authority. On account of state-of-the-art
chemical detection equipment installed next to your factory, there is no question that
the spillage will be detected (after the fertilizer production order has already been
completed). With the exception of the possibility of paying this fine, you do not
anticipate any other expenses.

Manipulation F: ex-post-state-probabilistic
By law, anyone who is caught dumping a new chemical into the lake will be fined
100,000 Shekels (around $25,000) by the municipal authority. That said, there is a
certain chance that you will not get caught, as the authorities may not detect any
spillage. No matter what, there is no doubt that you will manage to complete the
fertilizer production order before the authorities will be able to detect the spillage.
With the exception of the possibility of paying this fine, you do not anticipate any
other expenses.
Control:
The control group did not undergo any manipulation.
Questions (for all groups):
1. What is the minimal price you will request for producing the fertilizer, within
the framework of the legal situation described above (reminder: production
costs total 200,000 Shekels)?
2. Producing the fertilizer within the framework of the legal situation described
above is ethically objectionable: 1 (not objectionable) – 10 (objectionable).
3. Producing the fertilizer within the framework of the legal situation described
above is an appropriate step for me, personally: 1 (inappropriate) – 10
(appropriate).
4. Producing the fertilizer within the framework of the legal situation described
above does not contradict the law: 1 (contradict) – 10 (doesn’t contradict).
5. As much as possible, I will try not to produce the fertilizer within the
framework of the described legal situation: 1 (will not try) – 10 (will try).
6. Within the framework of the described legal situation, for the production of
the fertilizer, I will ask for an especially high price.1 (low price) – 10 (high
price).
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